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Abstract: Chilean salmon farming has been considered as an outstanding 
example of success after growing at double digit rates for more than twenty 
years. While the expansion was indeed dramatic, it came at the expense 
of severe sanitary and environmental deterioration. The outbreak in 2008 
of the infectious salmon anaemia, a viral disease that kills salmon, but 
does not affect humans, has made this utterly clear. The overexploitation 
of the ‘commons’ upon which the industry has grown and the lack of an 
adequate regulatory mechanism to monitor adverse environmental effects 
contributed to this disaster, which now threatens the future of the industry 
and the country benefiting from its natural comparative advantage for salmon 
farming. The paper shows that activities based on the exploitation of a 
common pool resource require quite a different analytical approach than the 
one conventional neoclassical theory offers us for the understanding of firm 
and industry behaviour. This study shows that industries of this sort enjoy 
unique location-specific conditions requiring specific know how, R&D, 
and strong public-private cooperation in order to attain environmentally 
sustainable long term growth.
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1.  Introduction 
The Chilean salmon farming industry experienced a dramatic downturn 
since 2008 with rapid spread of the Infectious Salmon Anaemia (ISA), a 
viral disease that affects the salmon’s immune system, eventually leading to 
death. With the benefit of hindsight we now know that the long term decay in 
industry performance has been the outcome of a complex process of gradual 
productivity deterioration that started in the midst of a hike in world prices 
for salmon, inducing an increase in fish density in the cultivation ponds and a 
subsequent fall in the quality of water and in fish welfare. The reason for this 
is typical of an individual firm’s seeking profit maximization, associated with 260      Michiko Iizuka and Jorge Katz  
increasing fish density in the cultivation tanks triggering industry failure as a 
result of overexploitation of the ‘common’. An abnormally high fish density 
in the cultivation tanks favours the horizontal transmission of pathogens and 
vectors, which operates freely in the waters and this facilitates the diffusion 
of viral diseases. This situation suggests a typical ‘tragedy of the commons’ 
scenario, closely resembling the one described by Hardin (1968). 
The purpose of this paper is to examine the economic and institutional 
circumstances that caused the systemic collapse in salmon farming in 
Chile by focusing both on firm, as well as on industry behaviour. Salmon 
farming depends on a highly particular and country-specific set of biological 
and environmental forces that demand location-specific knowledge and 
understanding, together with a set of institutions capable of governing the 
‘common’. It is important to notice that neoclassical production theory is 
helpful in explaining firm behaviour under more conventional circumstances, 
but it is next to useless in the case of activities like this one in which 
biological and environmental forces of an unknown nature introduce a 
significant degree of uncertainty and demand adaptive change in production 
organization. Neoclassical microeconomics is based upon the robot-like 
behaviour of a single ‘representative firm’ that optimizes future earnings 
under the constraint of a given set of exogenous parameters, perfectly 
understood and discounted by the entrepreneur. Little attention is paid in such 
a theoretical environment to the local carrying capacity and to the institutions 
conditioning firm and industry behaviour addressing the protection of the 
commons. 
In other words, salmon production – and aquaculture in general – belong 
in a conceptual and analytical sphere in which models of firm behaviour need 
to encompass the highly uncertain and probabilistic nature of the production 
conditions in which firms operate. Indeed, salmon farming and aquaculture 
appear much closer to the inductive and open research agenda advanced by 
contemporary evolutionary economics (Nelson and Winter, 2002) and the 
political economy approach of common pool resources (Ostrom, 1990). If 
we are to understand firm and industry behaviour under such circumstances, 
many new questions of an organizational and institutional nature need to be 
brought to the fore and location-specific research needs to be undertaken 
if production is to be done under long term environmentally sustainable 
conditions. 
The paper is structured in four sections. Section two presents theoretical 
considerations from the extant literature on natural resource based industries, 
economic governance scenarios where common pool resources (CPR) prevail 
and the contributions of evolutionary economics. Section three describes the 
behaviour of Chilean salmon farming companies paying special attention to 
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and institutions. In this section we present empirical evidence collected during 
the course of a field study carried out in mid-2009. Finally, we summarize the 
conclusions of our research and advance a few policy suggestions. 
2.  Theoretical Considerations
Three different bodies of literature bearing on the study of salmon farming 
are briefly reviewed in this section. We begin by briefly mentioning the early 
literature on natural resources as an impediment to growth, then examine 
governance issues and the role of institutions in ‘common pool’ based 
scenarios and finally we look at evolutionary theorizing on the behaviour of 
firms in CPRs. Shortcomings of dominant mainstream views are pointed out 
in all three cases.
2.1  Natural Resource Based Industries and Developing Countries 
Early development economists looked at natural resources as an impediment 
to growth, pointing out the long term decay in terms of trade of the 
natural resource exporting countries and to the capturing of the benefits 
of productivity growth and technological progress in the primary sector 
of the economy by the consumers of more developed, industrial nations 
(Prebisch, 1950; Singer, 1950; Sachs and Warner, 1995, 1997, 1999). 
However, under the impact of recent rapid advances in biology, genetics 
and other various sciences related to the exploitation of natural resources, 
some international organizations have suggested that natural resource based 
industries can become a strong ‘engine for growth’ as they have a high 
potential for the incorporation of new knowledge coming from the biological 
and environmental sciences (de Ferranti et al., 2002; ECLAC, 2004). The 
relevance of natural resource based industries as locus for knowledge 
generation activities has been pointed out by several studies (Athukorala and 
Sen, 1998; Owens and Wood, 1997; de Ferranti et al., 2002, von Tunzelmann 
and Acha, 2005). However, the success of such industries often requires 
careful attention to be given to local knowledge generation activities and 
environmental specificities. Katz (2004) has made this point arguing that these 
activities demand country-specific knowledge generation efforts if they are to 
operate efficiently. He argues that domestic companies cannot rely entirely on 
imported know how and foreign technological blue prints if they are correctly 
to manage local production conditions. 
It is important to understand that natural resource-based industries 
often operate on the basis of common pool resources (CPR), as is the case 
with salmon farming. The economics and governance of CPR-based sectors 
identifies a major research agenda to which we now turn. 262      Michiko Iizuka and Jorge Katz  
2.2  Management of CPR
The management of CPR1 generates an inner tension between individual 
users of the common and their profit maximizing behaviour, and a group 
of users (in this case, narrowly defined as an industry) and its collective 
performance. As each individual firm attempts to maximize its private use of 
the ‘common’ it eventually inflicts welfare losses to the rest of the group by 
depriving others from access (Feeny et al., 1990; Ostrom et al., 1999). Hardin 
(1968)2 had presented a simple model of ‘herder’ behaviour. By putting one 
more cow in a limited space of land (common), the individual’s maximization 
attempt – through the eventual overloading of the resource – would cause a 
reduction in the collective benefits to all users of the common. He addressed 
‘the tragedy of the commons’ by emphasizing the possibility of two different 
governance models of CPR, viz., one, government regulation (role of state) 
and two, exclusive private property ownership and the role of the market.
However, Ostrom (1990) considered Hardin’s example as grossly ‘over 
simplified’ and claimed that some social groups (including herders) can 
learn and struggle successfully against the threat of resource degradation 
through developing and maintaining self-governing institutions. Feeny et 
al., (1990) demonstrated using case studies, that neither state control nor 
markets work perfectly in favour of long term sustainability of the ‘common’. 
Solving the problem of CPR, requires actions to restrict access and create 
incentives for users to collectively invest in ‘preserving the resource instead 
of overexploiting it’ (Ostrom et al., 1999). Such a positive outcome requires 
an adequate combination of public and private partnership or collective 
action. Important to this argument is the fact that stakeholders in the common 
can ‘learn’ from interactions and therefore develop institutions capable of 
preventing the tragedy of the commons. To support sustainability,3 they have 
to act collectively for common purposes (Ostrom, 1990). 
Following Ostrom’s study (1990), research on the management of CPR 
concentrated on identifying the blueprint conditions for successful collec-
tive action to take place via a massive review of case studies (see Poteete 
and Ostrom, 2004; Agrawal, 2001).4 Nevertheless, as criticized by Agrawal 
(2001), these efforts concentrated only on the ‘ecology-human’ interaction 
overlooking the important external factors, such as markets, technology and 
population pressure to name a few, that have a strong and long lasting impact 
on the way CPR is managed. 
Others note that the idea of finding a general blueprint for successful 
CPR management is gradually being abandoned (Poteete and Ostrom, 2004: 
454). They state that, “given the wide variety of characteristics that groups 
possess, as well as, the diversity of ecological conditions they face, the rules 
that work well to facilitate collective action in one case may not work well in 
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management of CPR involves a ‘struggle’ for legitimacy that is only obtained 
from an adequate distribution of benefits and costs among stakeholders in 
each particular case. 
Recent studies on CPR management therefore, emphasize that successful 
management requires local specific institutions, which can co-evolve with 
changes in a broader set of global, as well as, local forces where CPR is 
embedded (Dietz et al., 2003, Ostrom et al., 1999). Dietz et al., (2003) argue 
that individual actors and global systems are interlinked in complex and 
multi-layered structures. Steins and Edwards (1999) propose nesting multiple 
platforms for resource negotiation with multiple users of commons. Ostrom 
(2009) attempted to create a general framework to analyze sustainability of 
social ecological systems. Holling et al. (1998) recognized that managing 
CPR is a problem of a systemic nature where “aspects of behavior are 
complex and unpredictable”. He states that CPR management is “non-
linear in nature, cross-scale in time and in space, and has an evolutionary 
character”. He believes that both natural and social systems develop 
“critical feedbacks across temporal and spatial scales” (Holling et al., 1998: 
352). What is interesting here is that all of the above authors focus on co-
evolving relationships between ecological and socioeconomic systems paying 
attention to a wider set of forces that might influence the management of 
CPR. They further state that sustainable economic activities involving CPR 
need institutions that link the environmental with socioeconomic forces in a 
‘location-specific’ way while paying attention to global impacts. However, 
it is also true that such institutions may not emerge naturally and might 
require some public sector intervention and regulation to induce behavioural 
change and collective action among stakeholders. For such collective action 
to emerge, the presence of trust and social capital among the stakeholders are 
considered crucial (Coleman, 1988).
The management of CPR also requires an understanding of local carrying 
capacity. The carrying capacity is generally discussed from four different 
angles of demography, economics, ecology and epistemology (see McMichael 
et al., 2003). Locating within the local context, allows the integration of the 
four different dimensions of carrying capacities coherently for understanding 
the sustainable management of CPR. In operational terms, understanding local 
carrying capacity would also require collaborative efforts of various experts 
and organizations. 
2.3  Evolutionary Theory of the Firm
Evolutionary economics looks at the process of economic transformations of 
firms, industry organization and institution paying attention to the role played 
by diverse agents based on their experience, and interaction among them. 264      Michiko Iizuka and Jorge Katz  
Evolutionary economics differs from neo-classical economics in various ways, 
but fundamentally in its disbelief in economic equilibrium. It considers that 
economic development is in constant disequilibrium due to the presence of 
entrepreneurs who innovate to stay competitive in the market (Schumpeter, 
1934). Nelson and Winter (1982) looked at the changes in technology and 
routines as firms go though processes of selection, increase in variety and 
establish routines. The market has an important role in selecting successful 
firms that could obtain more market share through competition while 
unsuccessful ones fall behind or are eliminated. The result of competition in 
products and practices is determined by routine, the standardized patterns of 
actions implemented by the firm. Both market and firm change and co-evolve 
constantly thereby they are in state of constant disequilibrium.
The successful firm in neoclassical economics achieves profit maximiza-
tion through price-based competition. Evolutionary economics introduces 
non-price competition through other factors such as quality of innovation. In 
real life the firms do not compete solely on the basis of price, but also through 
innovative activities. Evolutionary economics views the process of firms’ 
survival as dependent on how effectively firms can learn and unlearn the 
routines as they co-evolve with the market. Neoclassical economics assumes 
that there is universal rationality and information symmetry in learning 
processes while evolutionary economics casts doubt over such a proposition 
as firms’ rationality is ‘bounded’ and complex due to different forms of 
production organizations (see Lall, 1992; Nelson, 2008; Rasiah, 2009). 
There is an important distinction between competence and capability with 
regards to firms’ ability to change (Nelson and Winter, 2002; von Tunzelmann 
and Wang, 2007; von Tunzelmann, 2009). Although Nelson and Winter (2002) 
do not make a clear distinction between competence and capability they state, 
however, that competence is “achievable when skills and routines can be 
learned and perfected through practice” (Nelson and Winter, 2002: 29). From 
the evolutionary point of view then, importance is placed on how firms can 
handle contrasting demands from different types of situations through learning 
processes. Von Tunzelmann (2009: 446) makes more explicit comparison 
where he considers that capabilities are “directly involved in transformations”, 
while competencies are “previously transformed and are hired or otherwise 
bought in to assist in the ensuing process”. He sees capability as more closely 
associated with ‘dynamic capability’ (Teece et al., 2000) that enables firms to 
transform in co-evolutionary fashion.
Similarly, with reference to firm related activities, Katz (1987) makes a 
distinction between different sorts of capabilities being developed by firms 
pari passu with production. Firms first develop operational capabilities 
and much further in time new product and new process design capabilities. 
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about the state of the art. Viotti (2002) in an attempt to establish a framework 
for understanding technological change through a comparative study of South 
Korea and Brazil, distinguishes between production capability, improvement 
capability and innovation capability in his study of ‘National learning 
system’. He identifies both ‘active’ and ‘passive’ learning in the technology 
absorption pattern and considers that active learning enables innovation and 
is compatible with ‘Schumpeterian development’. As shown above, various 
attempts were made to distinguish the ability of firms to perform efficiently 
from that other set of capabilities that enables them to change and adapt to 
an ever-evolving environment. 
Much of the discussion so far on evolutionary economics is largely based 
upon the study of manufacturing industries in which firms’ capacity to interact 
with the market and co-evolve with it is the most important factor. This 
literature makes almost no mention of environmental sustainability. Neither 
does it discuss at great length, management of CPR which may (in case of 
natural resource based industries) have a large role in conditioning production 
outcomes and firms’ activities and strong influence on the trajectories of 
technological development. This is in contrast to the literature on management 
of CPR which recently started to look at more holistic interactions between 
‘ecology and the rest’ in a systemic way, but much in this area remains in 
the black box. In the industries based on natural resources, sustainability 
of CPR plays a crucial role in determining the ‘survival’ of firms as well 
as of the industry. However the evolutional theory of firms do not seem to 
have paid enough attention to the sustainability aspect of natural resource 
based industries, since most case studies are concentrated on manufacturing 
activities. Industries based on natural resources may therefore constitute a 
topic worth exploring as co-evolution must take place among market, CPR 
and technology to establish sustainable long term capabilities. 
Recent literature indicates that natural resource based industries can be 
an ‘engine for growth’ in developing countries. However, such an engine 
is dependent upon good management of CPR. When we look at the CPR 
literature, the discussion currently focuses on the importance of institutional 
arrangements to restrict access and create incentives for users (firms) to 
invest in protection of the resource rather than engaging themselves in 
overexploitation of the ‘common’. Furthermore, successful management of 
CPR is currently viewed more holistically to include a wider set of forces 
pertaining to global markets, science, technology and more. Identification 
of local carrying capacity is a complex task of finding equilibrium between 
ecology and human behaviour. The power to enforce strict regulatory 
rules and the ways in which these are enforced have an important role in 
determining such a co-evolutionary process. The presence of trust and social 
norms (social capital) is considered essential for the management of CPR 266      Michiko Iizuka and Jorge Katz  
to draw upon collective action. The evolutionary theory of firms, unlike 
the neoclassical one, emphasizes the importance of co-evolving nature of 
market, technology, and firms in transforming routines. It presents a useful 
framework for understanding transformation of firms and industries, but 
demands further consideration of the additional circumstances associated with 
CPR management.
3.  Chilean Salmon Industry
Chilean salmon farming provides a dramatic story of a non-native species 
being incepted in a highly receptive natural environment and later cultured 
to generate employment and rapid economic growth in poor coastal 
regions of Southern Chile. Both the genetic material and the production 
technology for salmon farming were originally imported from abroad and 
subsequently adapted to local environmental conditions. While local climatic 
and geographical factors were central to successful salmon cultivation, the 
sanitary crisis to emerge later on, demonstrates a lack of adequate ‘social 
technologies’ and institutions required for environmentally sustainable long 
term exploitation of the underlying natural comparative advantage. We 
discuss in this section the impact of this lack of domestic capabilities and the 
subsequent sanitary and environmental crisis resulting from such lack of local 
technological capabilities. 
3.1  Chilean Salmon Farming and the Recent Sanitary Crisis
Most studies on the Chilean salmon farming industry highlight two major 
facts. On the one hand, the important role the Chilean public sector played 
in the original inception of the industry and, on the other hand, the major 
role learning by doing and technological adaptation efforts had on its growth 
during the initial stages of industry expansion (see Katz, 2004; Iizuka, 2007; 
Maggi, 2002; Montero, 2004). In this paper we shall not spend a great deal of 
time looking at historical events. Rather, we shall concentrate on examining 
the recent sanitary and environmental crisis in order to illustrate the extent to 
which the lack of understanding about management of CPR underlies much 
of what has happened within Chilean salmon farming. 
Demography of Firms before the Crisis 
By the early 2000s salmon farming in Chile had reached the status of a 
mature oligopoly in which five firms produced more than 50 per cent of 
industry output and a similarly high share of exports. The gap between ‘large’ 
and ‘small’ firms increased significantly during the late 1990s even in spite Natural Resource Industries – Chilean Salmon Farming      267
of the fact that new entrants joined the industry in the initial years of the 
new century. We can divide salmon farming firms into three groups. First 
there were ‘traditional firms’ established during the initial years of industry 
inception in the 1980s followed by ‘traditional’ SMEs and, lastly, new firms 
entering the industry recently, many of which arrived from other industries 
such as industrial fisheries. 
Major differences in production organization and in company ‘culture’ 
prevail between these three different salmon farming companies. SMEs 
control one or very few cultivation concession sites and this makes their 
production organization quite rigid and inflexible. On the contrary, ‘large 
traditional’ salmon farming companies own a large number of cultivation 
permits and can program the geographical distribution of production according 
to the physical distribution of concession sites they control. As far as new 
entrants are concerned, many of them regard salmon farming as a portfolio 
investment option and were attracted by the high rate of profit the industry 
attained in recent years. Vignolo et al. (2007) mention that the increasing 
diversity in management ‘culture’´ and production organization induced by 
recent new entries might have resulted in the erosion of intra-industry trust 
and cooperative efforts – social capital – vis-à-vis the early period of industry 
inception in the 1980s. According to this view, the increasing diversity in 
Figure 1: Export Share by Size of Firms
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stakeholder composition might have negatively affected collective action 
aiming at protecting the ‘common’ (Ostrom, 1990).
Magnitude of the Crisis 
The industry suffered a dramatic downturn at the beginning of 2008 as the 
ISA spread with a devastating effect. The impact of the crisis was not limited 
to salmon farming firms alone as it rapidly reached the intermediate input and 
production services suppliers. Close to 20 thousand jobs were lost in the short 
period of two years since and numerous coastal villages whose socioeconomic 
functioning depended entirely on the demand for skilled and unskilled labour 
by salmon farming companies were thrown into social disarray. 
By 2010, the production of salmon had fallen to around 200 thousand tons 
down from its peak of nearly 700 thousand tons in 2006. By 2009 close to 60 
per cent of the cultivation centres were out of production. What started as a 
sanitary and environmental crisis very soon developed into a financial crisis as 
many firms simply could not service their loans from the banks. Their working 
capital evaporated rapidly as salmon continued to die in the cultivation tanks, 
or were processed and exported before complete maturity to avoid the risk of 
infection. Many firms came close to bankruptcy with banks quickly refusing 
to extend their credit facilities to finance new cultivations as the uncertainty 
began to proliferate. Under such circumstances a significant process of ‘de-
clustering’ emerged, with production service suppliers – e.g. veterinarians, 
divers, net repair personnel, feed-meal manufacturers and feeders – moving 
out of the region in search of new job opportunities. El Mercurio, which is 
the largest Chilean newspaper, estimated that the standing debt of the industry 
with the banking sector came close to US$2 billion by 2009, which accounted 
for nearly one year’s worth of exports. 
Direct Cause of the Crisis
It is commonly believed that the ISA virus was the source of the crisis 
apparently originating from Norway and arriving in Chile through imported 
salmon eggs. Although the first outbreak of ISA was reported by the local 
subsidiary of the Norwegian firm, Marine Harvest, many local specialists 
believe that a variant of the disease was already present in Chile for some time 
until certain environmental conditions – high density of fish in cultivation 
tanks, for example – induced its mutation and rapid spread (Bustos, 2008; 
Nieto, 2009). 
The evidence suggests that decaying sanitary conditions started even 
before the ISA actually became epidemic. During the initial years of inception, 
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rapidly during the 1990s to reach 200 thousand tons per annum by the end 
of that decade. Pari passu with the expansion of production the diffusion of 
pathogens became more noticeable. An independent survey of the sanitary 
situation carried out in the mid-1990s by local veterinarians confirms that 
the sanitary situation was worsening even before the ISA crisis had started 
(Bustos, 2008; Johnson, 2007; Nieto, 2009).
The local biologists and veterinarians we interviewed during the course 
of our fieldwork referred to the ‘ecological triad of illness’ as the interaction 
between the host (fish), the environment and the various pathogens acting 
in the environment.5 According to them, ‘becoming ill’ constitutes prima 
facie evidence that the state of equilibrium that normally obtains between the 
three components of the triad breaks down reducing the self-immunological 
defense capabilities of the fish. This is when the pathogen acts, infecting one 
or a few fishes first and then quickly spreading to the whole population in the 
cultivation tank. In other words, even if it is true that the impact of ISA virus 
has been quite strong, that should not induce us to believe that other sanitary 
and environmental problems were not present even before the outbreak of 
ISA affecting the functioning of the industry, its long-term productivity and 
Table 2: Emergence of New Diseases in Chilean Atlantic Salmon
Disease  6-7 years ago  Today
Bacterial kidney disease  X  X
Piscinketsiosis    X
Infectiouspancreatic necrosis  X  X
Vibriosis (v.ordeli)    X
Vibriosis (v.angillarium)     X
Ulcerative vibriosis    X
Streptococosis    X
Franciseltosis    X
Atypical furunculosis    X
Kudoa    X
Jandrice syndrome   
Nucleospondiosis  X  X
Flavovacteriosis  X  X
Columnaris  X  X
Yersimiosis  X  X
Saprolegiosis  X  X
Caligus  X  X
ISA    X
Amoebic gill disease    X
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sustainability. In other words the crisis should not be seen as a consequence 
of ISA, but rather as the cumulative result of sanitary and environmental 
mismanagement which has been present and worsening for a number of years 
before the outbreak of ISA.
3.2  Micro-evidence of Crisis 
Salmon farming is highly conditioned by biological and environmental factors 
that affect fish well-being in cultivation ponds and introduce a great deal of 
uncertainty both in individual firm production activities as well as in industry 
behaviour. Microeconomic behaviour needs to be closely coordinated with 
biological and environmental variables which are very imperfectly understood 
by firms. More research concerning local environmental conditions is required 
to ensure that the various actors in the ecology of salmon farming operate in 
a coordinated way. This sub-section explains why the standard neoclassical 
lens is highly inappropriate for such an understanding. 
Economics of Salmon Farming
Cultivating salmon (a carnivorous fish) in captivity involves a set of complex 
processes. It is important to maintain welfare and health of fish as these 
conditions affect productivity through its rate of growth and mortality. To 
balance welfare and health of fish requires location-specific knowledge and 
cannot be considered as standard and universal as economists sometimes do 
in relation to manufacturing production. Rearing salmon in captivity demands 
a great deal of generic as well as local specific scientific and technological 
understanding, which cannot simply be obtained by importing foreign know 
how and technological ‘blue-prints’. 
Salmon farming firms operate with ‘batch’ production organization 
arrangements. Typically, salmon is first bred in freshwater lakes. Once 
matured, they are transferred into the sea where they are then cultivated in 
semi-open enclosures until they are ready for harvesting. The latter takes close 
to 15 months depending on the species involved. The fish is ready when it 
reaches a certain weight (usually 3.5 kg on average). If a conventional cost/
benefit calculation is applied, the timing for harvesting is reached when the 
marginal cost of maintaining the fish in the enclosure equals marginal revenue. 
The decision is made by comparing feeding costs, other intermediate inputs, 
market value of salmon and the rate of interest. Thus, equilibrium for the 
individual farmer is reached when the proportional increase in salmon price 
– net of feeding and harvesting costs – equals the opportunity cost of further 
maintaining the fish in the cultivation tank.
We notice that firm behaviour is determined by two quite different sets of 
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rate of salmon. On the other hand, economic and financial ones determine 
optimal harvesting time. 
Even within the same ‘batch’ (cohort), each individual fish grows 
differently from the rest due to genetically inherited conditions, nutritional 
contents of feed and else. To a certain extent, producers can control the 
incidence of these genetic and biological forces by selecting high quality 
smolts for cultivation. However, it is not possible to completely eliminate the 
biological and genetic variability within each ‘batch’. On the other hand, firms 
also make strategic decisions concerning production methods, fish density in 
the enclosure, bio-security measures, daily food ration, energy content of the 
diet, nature of the feeding process, food supplement, vaccination, medication, 
feeding techniques to name just a few. The interaction of these two sets of 
forces determines firm productivity. It needs to be understood that the impact 
of these variables is dependent upon the initial genetic and health conditions 
of each cohort of smolts, as well as upon other local contextual factors such 
as oceanographic conditions, i.e. ocean depth, strength of water currents, 
nature of the seabed, nutrients and oxygen in the water, water temperature 
and more. Together with the previously mentioned ones these variables also 
affect individual firm productivity. Many of these variables are clearly outside 
the control of firms so companies are required to operate with simple ‘rule of 
thumb’ through trial and error. 
In other words, unlike manufacturing in which production routines can 
be assumed to be fairly stable and predictable across production campaigns, 
production cycles and processes in aquaculture are extremely variant as 
they are heavily dependent on uncertain environmental conditions. Salmon 
farming constitutes a typical production activity in which uncertainty and 
the volatile nature of biological and environmental conditions systematically 
affect production outcomes. 
Firm Behaviour 
As mentioned earlier, the ISA crisis did not happen just because of the spread 
of the pathogen. It required certain conditions (health and welfare of fish 
in the ponds, density of pathogenic agents in the water, fragility of sanitary 
conditions and more) to reach the threshold level for the disease to become 
epidemic. This section will look at firm behaviour and underlying factors that 
led to the crisis.
Concentration of Cultivation 
Currently, three quarters of the salmon farming concessions granted in 
Chile are located in a small territory covering no more than 300 km2. The 
concentration of cultivation centres in Chile is striking when compared to 274      Michiko Iizuka and Jorge Katz  
Norway, which has a total area of 1,700 km2 for total cultivation area. Despite 
the limited areas of territories used for farming, there were no regulations 
monitoring distance between salmon farming centres (currently 2.27 km) until 
Reglamento Ambiental para la Acuicultura (RAMA) was enacted in 2001. As 
the result, cultivation centres in Chile are much more densely situated than in 
Norway.6 The concentration of firms in a very small territory is also caused 
by several factors including: lack of physical infrastructure (such as road and 
port) connecting the cultivation centres to fish processing plants or to transport 
inputs (feeds, equipment, etc.); lack of human resources to work in the 
centres; and, a short supply of public services such as schools and hospitals 
for the families of employees working for the industry. Such lack of human 
resources, public services and infrastructure resulted in the concentration of 
cultivation sites in limited geographical areas.
Increasing Fish Density
The production of salmon in Chile increased dramatically from 1999 onward. 
By 2006 it had reached an all time historical peak, at just about the same 
output level as Norway, the biggest exporter (see Figure 3) in the world. 
The strong incentive to increase production came from the rapid rise in 
world prices from 2001 to 2002 as a result of the diffusion of the avian flu. 
The average price of salmon increased from around US$3 per kg in 2003 
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to approximately US$6 per kg in 2006 (see Figure 4). In our view, such 
price increase and its impact upon profit margins induced many local firms 
to increase fish density in their cultivation tanks beyond their biologically 
sustainable levels. 
The evidence from Table 3 shows that the volume of fish per cultivation 
centre is much larger in Chile than in Norway (see Table 3). Data from 
EWOS, a salmon food company, effectively shows that the average number 
of fish per cultivation centre increased quite significantly (see Figure 5) since 
2003 (EWOS Health, 2007). In other words, salmon farming companies 
behaved quite similarly to Hardin’s herder mentality of increasing the volume 
of output from a given cultivation tank by adding ‘one more fish’ to a fix unit 
of space and resource. As the farming water is part of the CPR affecting other 
firms in the area, the horizontal transmission of vectors and pathogens had to 
be, a priori, expected. 
Once a given threshold of fish density in the pond is reached, increasing 
fish density will further worsen the ‘environment’ in which the biomass 
is reared. Data collected by EWOS Health (2007) provides circumstantial 
evidence of decreasing biological quality of the CPR, the ‘water’. Table 
Figure 4: Fluctuation of Average Price of Salmon
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Table 3: Average Salmon Weight per Cultivation Centre: Chile and Norway
Chilean cultivation site  Average weight (tons/centre)
Chiloe centro  1,136
Melinka  1,106
Chiloe sur  859




Seno reloncavi  1,076
Total  1,021






More og fjordane  424
Hordaland  374
Rogaland  506
Ovrige fylker  689
Total  474
Source: EWOS Health (2007). 
Figure 5: Average Number of Fish in each Cultivation Centre (Atlantic Salmon)
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4 demonstrates the decreasing trend in productivity of firms in relation to 
‘water’. While the volume of salmon produced increased from 2003 onwards, 
other productivity indicators also show signs of deterioration. For example, 
the average weight per fish at the time of harvesting declined from 4.4 kg to 
4.1 kg, the number of days required for harvesting expanded from 487 days 
to 543 days, and the weight of salmon produced (output) per unit of input 
(smolt or egg) decreased from 3.7 kg to 3.1 kg for the former and 1.3 kg to 
1.1 kg for the latter. These figures indicate that the economic and biological 
rates of conversion7 showed signs of deterioration, rising from 1.36 to 1.52 
and from 1.24 to 1.34 respectively, i.e. more kilos of feed were needed to 
produce 1 kg of salmon. Furthermore, Figure 6 shows that the rate of fish 
mortality increased from 15 per cent in 2003 to 25 per cent in 2007. All of 
the above does not take into account the increase in expenditure incurred 
on vaccines and antibiotics required to prevent fish from getting ill, and the 
additional feed meal needed as a consequence of the extension of harvesting 
time.8 In a nutshell, all economic and biological indicators point in one and 
the same direction, i.e. industrial productivity declining steadily from 2003 
to 2007, even before the ISA disease started to spread in the midst of a hike 
in the price of salmon, and the production boom. 
Hence, whereas export production soared from 2003 to 2006 and the 
sale of salmon increased, this was achieved concomitantly with a decrease 
in industry performance. Firms continued to increase production as world 
prices for salmon went up. Overall, the increase in the volume of production, 
even taking into account the loss of output due to higher mortality rate and 
Table 4: Performance Indicator of Chilean Atlantic Salmon 
     2003  2004  2005  2006  2007
Volume of production   71,856   76,968   82,838   102,015   –   
  (000) kg
Kg/smolt  3.71  3.66  3.57  3.34  3.14
Kg/egg  1.30  1.28  1.25  1.17  1.10
Average weight at the   4,444   4,555   4,342   4,219   4,130 
  harvest time
Economic factor   1.36  1.40  1.38  1.42  1.52
  conversion rate
Biological factor   1.24  1.27  1.28  1.30  1.34
  conversion rate
Days required until   487  497  484  488  543
  harvesting
Source: EWOS Health (2007).278      Michiko Iizuka and Jorge Katz  
additional costs incurred to finance additional feed-meal and longer harvesting 
times, plus antibiotics and vaccines, still raised revenue because the marginal 
loss of productivity was valued less than the marginal gain from the increase 
in international price. In other words, the decision to put ‘one more fish in the 
pond’ was very much driven by rising world prices of salmon and in spite of 
the rising cost resulting from decaying local sustainability. 
Furthermore, collective action also failed following a deterioration of 
trust and social norms (social capital) among firms (see Vignolo et al., 2007). 
Instead of taking collective action to secure a long term sustainable path, the 
firms opted for an opportunistic path of short term profit maximization. It is 
appropriate to notice the weakness of institutional arrangements monitoring 
access to CPR and the lack of incentive for users to do more research 
exploring optimal resource loading capacity. 
Hence, the evidence is sufficient for us to conclude that the short term 
gains in production achieved from economies of scale and cumulative 
technological improvements such as much larger cultivation tanks, digital 
feeding technologies that were incorporated by salmon companies during the 
last decade, have been partially or totally destroyed by the fall in the marginal 
productivity of CPR. Each firm behaved rationally by trying to maximize 
profits in the context of given exogenous parameters, but with a collective 
outcome that resulted in the disregard of the CPR, thereby exposing the 
industry to the catastrophe. 
Figure 6: Mortality Rate of Salmon
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3.3  Knowledge Acquisition and Organizational Routine 
One of the important ways to establish local knowledge is to invest in R&D. 
Another is to promote diffusion of knowledge among the stakeholders to 
create local specific technological capabilities. In the early days of Chilean 
salmon farming, firms acquired knowledge through ‘learning by doing’ and 
‘trial and error’ processes. A great deal of ‘incremental’ knowledge produc-
tion was obtained in that way. We believe that in the initial phase of the 
industry local firms made a huge ‘adaptive’ technological effort facilitated by 
the role of Fundacion Chile, a public-private sector organization (Fundacion 
Chile, 1989). 
During the mid-1990s salmon firms became technologically more 
sophisticated, but they did so by importing capital goods such as computers, 
automatic processing technologies, scientific food formulae, to name a few. 
The technological gaps vis-à-vis the international ‘state of the art’ were 
gradually reduced at least as far as large local producers are concerned. But 
even the more successful firms in the industry did very little in terms of 
domestic R&D efforts. Chilean firms acquired ‘competence’ in the production 
of salmon, but they did not attain capability to deal with technological issues 
associated with environmental sustainability and biological and oceanographic 
forces impacting sanitary conditions. 
Chilean R&D investment is quite low in general and it is particularly low 
in aquaculture when compared to Norway and Scotland. This does not mean 
that Chile completely ignored knowledge acquisition and creation. In fact, 
some efforts in promoting innovation and research were done by two public 
sector organizations that financed R&D. One is the National Commission for 
Scientific and Technological Research (CONICYT) which financed National 
Fund for Scientific and Technological Development (FONDECYT). The 
other is Chilean Economic Development Agency (CORFO) which did so 
with Fontec & InnovaChile.9 Despite efforts made to promote innovation and 
research in this sector, innovation projects supported by CORFO have been 
focused on short term problem solving issues while the ones financed by the 
CONICYT were not fully utilized by the industry due to the lack of adequate 
university-industry linkages (OECD, 2007). In sum, salmon farming in Chile 
was capable of developing production competence in producing good quality 
output, but was not capable of obtaining long term capabilities for adequately 
developing country-specific know how and technology to secure the long 
term environmentally sustainable operation of the industry (von Tunzelmann 
(2009). The funding for R&D is present and detailed analysis of the amount 
invested in R&D (Bravo et al., 2007) shows10 that much of the research 
was conducted to enhance productive technology, but did not address more 
fundamental basic research issues specific to the Chilean context such as to 
understand local carrying capacity. 280      Michiko Iizuka and Jorge Katz  
From the standpoint of technological innovation, Chilean salmon farming 
firms became ‘world class’ in production. However, this was achieved without 
concomitantly developing domestic scientific and technological capabilities 
able to provide local solutions to emerging new questions of bio-security, 
environmental sustainability, control of emerging pathogens and more. 
Producers established their international competence, importing equipment 
and production know how from abroad, but did not simultaneously pay 
attention to the specificity of local environmental conditions. This lack of 
attention to local sustainability is a prominent feature for catching up countries 
in aquaculture such as Chile, because most of the advanced countries11 with 
long traditions in aquaculture have institutions that facilitate the management 
of CPR and promote domestic knowledge generation efforts adapted to local 
specific circumstances. 
3.4  Regulatory Institutions 
Chilean aquaculture regulation has not been organized to effectively address 
improvements in firms’ sanitary and environmental practices. The first 
regulatory framework specific to aquaculture was enacted in 2000-2001. Due 
to the novel nature of the industry, private sector knowledge is always more 
advanced than that of the public regulatory body. Furthermore, the public 
sector has placed more emphasis on a developmental rather than a regulatory 
role to promote this new exporting industry, which is reflected in the fact 
that the National Fishery Service Agency (Servicio Nacional de PESCA 
– SERNAPESCA) did not have an independent regulatory body, resources 
and manpower to monitor firms for regulatory compliance until as recently 
as 2009. In short, the knowledge gap with which the public regulatory body 
has operated, the emphasis public officials have put on promoting exports 
and the lack of resources and political will to ensure compliance by firms to 
the existing environmental rules contributed to the environmental collapse of 
the industry. 
4.  Conclusions
Recent expansion of demand and rising world prices of natural resources has 
created a production boom for natural resource endowed countries. This paper 
sought to establish that in the absence of adequate institutional arrangements 
in accordance with the local carrying capacity, countries can lose valuable 
natural resources and face severe environmental disaster in exchange for 
short-term economic gains. 
The recent crisis of salmon farming in Chile constitutes a clear example 
that shows neither firms nor government regulatory agencies being able to 
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exponential growth for more than two decades and as a result of that attained 
world status as an efficient salmon provider. Industrial structure and firm 
behaviour significantly improved production volume and competitiveness to 
maximize profits. 
In conventional neoclassical terms the Chilean salmon farming industry 
attained large economies of scale, ‘technological deepening’ and a higher 
capital labour ratio all of which account for a significant expansion in growth 
and productivity. The industry evolved along its ‘life cycle’ becoming 
a mature oligopoly. The larger firms in the industry moved closer to the 
international technological frontier, which helped them close the gap with 
world leaders in salmon farming. Blinded by the overall climate of success 
and rising international prices, the firms started to overexploit the CPR to 
raise unit production volume so as to maximize short term profits. In doing so 
they myopically neglected the long term sustainability of the common pool. 
If only the instruments of evolutionary economics had been used successfully 
here, a new set of institutions might have helped the agents and public sector 
organizations to understand the role of biological, sanitary and environmental 
forces and could have helped the effective strengthening of the long term 
exploitation of the common under sustainable conditions. 
The firms increased production volume making Chile the top producer 
next to Norway. Nevertheless, collective and local institution to manage 
CPR did not develop pari passu with the above. Furthermore, firms did 
not understand that they needed to spend more on R&D activities in order 
to adequately manage local production conditions and the technological 
specificity of the domestic environment. The joint impact of a lack of local 
knowledge on the CPR (local carrying capacity) and of adequate and enforced 
regulations and institutional arrangements to manage the CPR, eventually 
developed in this new version of the tragedy of the commons. Neither the 
firms nor the government were able to stop what can, a priori, be expected 
to develop into a social failure to exploit in a sustainable way a rich national 
endowment of natural comparative advantages. 
An important lesson that can be drawn from this case concerning 
industries dependent on the long term sustainability of the natural endowment 
in which they are based, demands a very strong interaction between the 
economics of industry growth and the evolution of associated institutions. This 
has become all the more important given the ascendance of natural resources 
in several developing countries as an engine of growth. Unlike conventional 
manufacturing industries, natural resource based industries require cognizance 
of local biological and environmental conditions that conventional models 
of firm behaviour do not demand. It can be seen that the lack of ‘collective 
action’ and institutional arrangements to monitor and manage CPR eventually 
damaged the long term sustainability of the industry. 282      Michiko Iizuka and Jorge Katz  
Appendix 1
Box 1: Estimate of Losses from ISA Crisis, 2000-2005
Bases of calculation 
–   accumulated mortality per year: increased 65% (from 15%-25%)
–   days required for harvesting: increased 10% (from 487 to 543 days)
–   weight at harvesting: decreased by 8% (4.5 kg to 4.1 kg)
–   kg of harvest for fix amount of smolts introduced: decreased by 19% (3.7 
to 2.9)
Direct loss (short term)
–   loss in fresh water phase: 2000/smolt  US$50 million
–   loss of biomass 
    kg/smolt: 96000 tons less x current price of  US$230 million
    smolt, 2.4/kg
    loss from less growth:   US$55 million
–   economic conversion factor: 12% higher  US$126 million
    total loss adding above: 
    treatment cost:  US$52 million
    operational cost:   US$20 million 
    processing cost:   US$44 million 
Total loss:   US$550-600 million
Source: Johnson (2007).  
Box 1 presents cost estimates of environmental degradation prior to the ISA 
crisis in 2008. The calculation shows an estimated total cost of US$550-US$600 
million accounted for the direct costs between 2000-2005, excluding incurred and 
indirect costs registered during this period and afterwards. Hence, this provides an 
approximation of the opportunity cost of resource overexploitation. The estimates, 
which are based on a careful reflection on actual costs highlights the importance 
of environmental sustainability as an essential condition for adequate industry 
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Notes
 1.  Common pool resources (CPR) include those properties that can have exclud-
ability (it is costly to exclude others from using the resources) and subtractability 
(each user is capable of subtracting from the welfare of other users) (Feeny et 
al., 1990, Ostrom et al., 1999). Examples include fisheries, wildlife, surface and 
groundwater, ranges and forests.
 2.  A similar idea to this was already presented by Gordon in 1954 and Scott in 1955, 
or even earlier by Lloyd in the 1830s (Feeny et al., 1990 and Hardin, 1998).
 3.  Sustainability is defined as “maintaining the capacity of the joint economy-
environment system to continue to satisfy the needs and desires of humans for a 
long time into the future” (Common and Stagl, 2005: 8).
 4.  Such as “conditions of a resource, and of the users of a resource, that are most 
conducive to local users self-organizing to find solutions to common dilemmas” 
(Ostrom, 1999: 495).
 5.  The authors acknowledge valuable collaboration by local biologists and 
veterinarians interviewed during the course of their field work. Among many 
others, we are grateful to Dr. D. Nieto, Dr. P. Bustos, Dr. S. Bravo and Dr. C. 
Wurmann. 
 6.  This was confirmed in the recent public lecture by Mr. Puchi, of AquaChile SA 
– the largest Chilean salmon farming firm. He confirms this point by saying that: 
“production is 50% larger per concession in Chile while total cultivation area is 
70% smaller” (Pucchi, 2009).
 7.  Economic conversion rate is the rate at which 1 kg of feed converted into 1 kg 
of salmon in economic value terms. Biological conversion rate is in biological 
terms.
 8.  See Box 1 (Appendix 1) for more detailed estimate calculations for the loss.
 9.  The total expenditure incurred on aquaculture in1983-2005 is $80,143,039 million 
Chilean pesos (approximately, US$17,000 million dollars) (Bravo et al., 2007).
  10.  The analysis showed that there was emphasis on egg production, disease control, 
etc., however none was dedicated to basic research on local carrying capacity for 
instance. 
  11.  For example, the Norwegian legal framework explicitly ensures the long-term 
sustainability of local environment and business. They have two types of sources 
for the funds allocated to finance R&D in aquaculture: the funds granted by the 
government and a fund created from the collection of royalties from concessions 
for the use of the common – or patents – by salmon farms. The funds provided 
by patents work through payment of royalty by the exporters of fish and fishery 
products. These funds are used in R&D projects that benefit the industry and 
are distributed in the form of subsidies. In this way, the state ensures creation 
of knowledge for managing CPR through investing in R&D and research. In 
other words in Norway, where fishing has been one of the dominant economic 
activities, institutions balancing environmental and business interests were 
already systemically implemented. Other countries in which aquaculture plays a 
significant role – such as UK, Canada, Spain – also have institutions to promote 
research agendas focusing on environmental impact, health management and food 
safety (Bravo et al., 2007).284      Michiko Iizuka and Jorge Katz  
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